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•	 Include	MRE	within	the	school	
curriculum. Notices posted on 
school premises and in public 
places could make people more 
aware of the program’s avail-
ability. Interactive programs, 
such as street dramas, quiz con-
tests and essay competitions, 
would bring greater attention 
to MRE programs.
•	 Accelerate	the	campaign	for	de-
claring schools “zones of peace.” 
•	 Ensure	 MRE	 is	 incorporated	
into military and police training.
•	 Distribute	MRE	materials	to	a	
wider population. Addition-
ally, these materials should 
be published in the various 
languages represented by the 
districts and should more ac-
curately depict and represent 
the local population.
•	 Increase	 government	 funding	
to MRE programs.
•	 Incorporate	 information	 about	
common consumer goods used 
to make explosive devices into 
the MRE programs. 
•	 Promote	 MRE	 in	 children’s	
magazines. Additional infor-
mation could be effective in 
reaching small children. 
•	 Promote	 MRE	 on	 radio	 and	
TV stations.
•	 Arrange	 for	 the	 facilitators	 to	
meet with the cadres of the 
emerging armed groups such 
as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti 
Morcha (Terai People’s Libera-
tion Front)–Goit and Jwala Singh 
factions, Madhesi Mukti Tigers, 
Madhesi Virus Killer, Terai Jana 
Kranti Parishad and others.
•	 Create	 and	 hang	 wall	 calen-
dars. Calendars, with their 
many pages, dates, events and 
holidays, would be effective as 
they can be hung on the walls 
of school buildings where stu-
dents can see the educational 
message year round. 
Difficulties
Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal 
faces numerous challenges in carry-
ing out its MRE programs. For in-
stance, an incident occurred while 
NCBL was on its way to Pakari in the 
Saptari district to conduct MRE. The 
Tigers questioned NCBL, suspecting 
them of propagating fear among the 
population. NCBL was able to carry 
through with MRE, but an armed 
sentry watched over the sessions at 
all times. Conflict erupted in the Te-
rai districts, further exacerbating the 
situation as armed groups continual-
ly kept an eye on MRE program fa-
cilitators, inspecting the resource 
materials for possible propaganda 
against the armed groups. 
Strikes, highway blockades and 
arson continue to create obstacles 
for NCBL facilitators. Furthermore, 
limited resources remain a problem. 
Conclusion
NCBL constantly faces obsta-
cles to its MRE programs in Nepal. 
Mines continue to injure, maim, 
and kill men, women and children 
in the rural areas. The emergence 
of various armed groups in the Te-
rai has further necessitated con-
ducting MRE, and it has become 
essential for the government to 
sign the AP Mine Ban Convention 
and to ensure assistance is provid-
ed to mine victims. Furthermore, 
engagement in MRE and various 
peace-building processes has be-
come imperative in order to restore 
lasting peace in Nepal.
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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Between 27 December 2008, and 18 Jan-uary 2009, the Israel Defence Forces con-ducted Operation Cast Lead, a military 
campaign with the objective of preventing Pales-
tinian militants from firing homemade rockets 
into Israeli territory. The campaign caused se-
vere damage to infrastructure, including roads, 
government offices, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, U.N. facilities, schools, hospitals and agri-
cultural land. Following the Israeli withdrawal, 
the United Nations Mine Action Service—at the 
request of the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tories, and in coordination with the U.N. Mine 
Action Team—agreed to initiate a Technical 
Assessment Mission under the United Nations 
Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid 
Response. This team arrived in Gaza on 23 Janu-
ary 2009, with these objectives: 
•	  Establish the level of unexploded-
ordnance contamination
•	  Determine what assistance UNMAT and 
the international mine-action commu-
nity could provide to the affected civil-
ian population, the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
gees in the Near East, the U.N. Country 
Team and other humanitarian actors
The Rapid Response to 
                   Operation Cast Lead
by Elena Rice [ United Nations Mine Action Service ] 
When the United Nations Mine Action Service was asked to assess the need for a 
mine-action presence in the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead, a 23-day con-
flict involving the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militias in 2008, it was thrust 
into one of the world’s most complicated humanitarian operating environments. This 
article provides a background for the mine-action program in Gaza, summarizing the 
key challenges and lessons learned during the first four months of operations in this 
complex environment.
•	  Facilitate the opening of humanitarian 
corridors and the delivery of humani-
tarian aid in line with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 18601
It became clear to the Technical Assess-
ment Mission team that in the days immedi-
Damage to a classroom in a Balgis al Yemen 
school, one of the many buildings investigated by 
the Technical Assessment team.
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ately following the conflict, 
Palestinian forces in Gaza had 
conducted surface clearance 
of unexploded ordnance, 
moving items to central 
storage locations where they 
could be kept prior to their de-
struction. They conclud-
ed, however, that a number 
of international explosive-
ordnance-disposal teams 
would be required to sup-
port the safe return of the 
humanitarian community to 
Gaza. These teams would 
be needed to dispose of the 
remaining UXO that still 
littered schools, U.N. and 
NGO offices, hospitals and 
homes, as well as UXO that 
was expected to be found 
buried among the rubble of 
destroyed buildings. Under 
the coordination of UNMAS, 
the UNMAT–Gaza Office 
was established to initiate a 
rapid response to neutralize 
the UXO threat.
The Threat
While anti-tank mines 
were used as a source of ex-
plosives to support the me-
chanical razing of homes, 
UNMAT found little evi-
dence to suggest that land-
mines were used otherwise. 
The key threat was from 
UXO, with urban centers be-
ing the most heavily affect-
ed. As of early June 2009, 28 
percent of items discovered 
contained white phosphorus and 72 
percent contained high explosives. 
As of 30 June 2009, unconfirmed re-
ports indicated there had been nine 
post-war accidents resulting in eight 
fatalities and 27 injuries.
Operations
In the 10 days immediately fol-
lowing the cessation of hostilities, 
UNMAT and implementing part-
ners conducted UXO-investigation 
tasks that facilitated the opening of 
37 schools, Gaza’s six main ar-
terial routes, and key U.N. of-
fices and warehouses. Within 
six weeks, all U.N. facilities, 
contaminated schools and 
hospitals in Gaza—and a ma-
jority of clinics—had been 
surveyed and the UXO was 
removed. The core remaining 
UXO threat now lies with-
in the ruins of collapsed and 
damaged buildings. There is 
a high probability that UXO 
remains in the rubble of the 
15,550 housing units that 
were destroyed or damaged 
in the conflict. 
The United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Pal-
estine Refugees in the Near 
East and the United Nations 
Development Programme, 
as well as several nongovern-
mental organizations, have 
initiated projects to remove 
more than 150,000 tonnes 
(165,000 U.S. tons) of rub-
ble from these buildings, a 
necessary precursor to re-
construction of homes and 
other structures. UNMAT 
advised UNRWA and UNDP 
that if current trends contin-
ue, there is a medium to high 
risk of UXO contamination 
in 49 percent of collapsed/
damaged buildings. All or-
ganizations involved with 
rubble removal have there-
fore placed a strong empha-
sis on explosive-ordnance 
disposal in their operational 
planning, the result of a major in-
formation push on the part of mine-
action staff and the insistence of 
several of the donors supporting the 
rubble removal that mine action be 
written into project documents.
The key focus of mine-action operations will be sup-
porting the process of rubble removal and reconstruc-
tion by ensuring that the estimated 9,000 Palestinians 
involved in this complicated task are able to carry it out 
with the minimum possible threat of injury or death 
from UXO. This task will be achieved through UNMAT 
input into the assessment and planning for such proj-
ects, extensive UXO identification and awareness train-
ing for those involved, UXO-specific task planning and 
site-management training for site supervisors, and the 
provision of an “on call” EOD service when items of 
UXO are located among the ruins of buildings. 
The Challenges
A wide array of political-, security-, access- and 
information-related challenges combine to make 
Gaza a highly complex operating environment.
Politics. Gaza is, de facto, controlled by Hamas, 
with other clan, paramilitary and private-sector ac-
tors enjoying significant inf luence. Still, a majority 
of the international community views the Palestinian 
Authority (predominantly Fatah) as the legitimate 
governing body for all of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, including Gaza. Power struggles between 
Hamas and Fatah have led to violent clashes in both 
Gaza and the West Bank. Ambiguity surrounding the 
question of who runs Gaza has caused complications 
for UNMAT and implementing partners, in particular 
when trying to distinguish with which local-authority 
actors to coordinate. Getting the job done in accordance 
with ethical considerations, mindful of the humanitar-
ian principle of “do no harm,” and without aggravating 
any of the actors whose support is necessary for sus-
tained operations, has involved a delicate balancing act. 
Access. While the intra-Palestinian power struggles 
create a challenging environment in which to operate, the 
Gaza context is further affected by the influence of Israel, 
which controls access for the vast majority of people and 
goods into and out of Gaza. Representatives of interna-
tional aid organizations and the foreign media can enter 
subject to coordination with and security clearance from 
the Israeli authorities; however, entry and exit must be co-
ordinated in advance, and passage through the high-
security Erez terminal between Israel and Gaza is often 
a lengthy process. In the initial weeks of the mine-action 
program, the process of gaining permission for individual 
NGO staff to enter Gaza often took several weeks—a long 
period of time in the context of a rapid-response scenario. 
Robert Serry, the U.N. Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process, has identified access as the 
key challenge to humanitarian work in Gaza. Given 
the obvious Israeli security concerns associated with 
permitting mine-action equipment and explosives to 
be brought into Gaza, gaining approval to import this 
equipment in time to be effective has been one of the big-
gest challenges. All equipment brought into Gaza must be 
approved in advance by the Coordinator of Government Af-
fairs in the Territories. Access for specialist EOD and protec-
tive equipment has now been approved (three months after 
the first request was made), and approval for importation of 
explosives and other associated equipment needed for UXO 
destruction was granted in principle in late May 2009. 
Security. The Israel Defense Forces continue to operate 
in and around Gaza, often in response to militant groups 
directing homemade rockets toward Israel. Movement of 
U.N. staff is severely restricted under U.N. security reg-
ulations, and while some parameters may be warranted, 
the risk-averse nature of these decisions can severely im-
pact operational-planning implementation and quali-
ty assurance. Ongoing Israeli military operations in the 
buffer zone inside Gaza adjoining Israel mean that mine-
action work in these areas must be coordinated with the 
IDF, often implying delays. The Gaza Strip is a small area, 
increasing the possibility that teams will find themselves 
in the wrong place at the wrong time; thus, ground in-
cursions, targeted airstrikes and ongoing militant opera-
tions constitute the key threats to staff safety.
A woman walks past ruins of a building UnMAT–GO 
will investigate for evidence of UXO.
UXO will likely be found in these Gazan buildings.
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Information and coordination. Gathering infor-
mation on the extent and nature of the UXO threat has not 
been a straightforward task. On occasion, local authorities 
have denied access to sensitive areas for teams conduct-
ing risk assessments. Initial post-conflict assessments by 
the United Nations and other international bodies did 
not look at the possible impact of UXO. An internation-
al mine-action sector has not played a role in Gazan hu-
manitarian and recovery efforts previously; thus, those 
responsible for planning did not factor in the poten-
tial that UXO contamination would impact the people 
or humanitarian operations. Furthermore, as a major-
ity of mine-action work will be conducted in support of 
the work of other agencies, coordination of mine-action 
activities is strongly linked to other agencies’ funding 
and planning. As most UXO remains within the rubble 
of damaged buildings, UNMAT is now affected opera-
tionally by other agencies’ planning—or lack thereof—
as well as their ability to implement projects in a 
timely manner. 
Other challenges have included:
•	  Establishing relationships as a new actor on the 
humanitarian scene and gaining an understand-
ing of who does what, where, and why in a highly 
politically-charged and sensitive operating envi-
ronment (although building relationships with 
longer-established U.N. and NGO entities that 
could provide advice has proven valuable).
•	  Suitable mapping of Gaza’s general area has not 
been available, with implications for coordina-
tion with IDF, accurate record-keeping and op-
erational tasking.
•	  The media has not always been a positive force, as 
information relevant to or concerning the mine-
action program has, on occasion, 
been used out of context or twisted 
to negative effect. 
Overall, UNMAT has learned 
to work around, or despite, these 
challenges, and to develop solu-
tions or alternatives. 
Lessons Learned
A key lesson—reinforced at many 
junctures—has been the necessi-
ty of keeping staff and equipment 
to the minimum quantities neces-
sary. The UNMAT consists of a Pro-
gramme Manager, Security Officer, 
Support Services Officer and Pro-
gramme Officer, with four nation-
al staff. The NGO implementing 
partners have operated with be-
tween five and seven one-man EOD 
teams, a Community-liaison Man-
ager, and a small international and 
national support component. Dur-
ing the first months, prior to the 
approval and importation of EOD 
equipment, teams had no option but to work with rudi-
mentary non-specialist tools, and to carefully prioritize 
only the items truly essential for operations. Planning 
of program requirements was based on the realization 
that a light footprint was most likely to be successful in 
an environment in which access is not straightforward.
The Coordinator of Government Affairs in the Ter-
ritories stated in January that only mine-action organi-
zations falling under the coordination of the U.N. Mine 
Action Team would be permitted to operate in Gaza. 
UNMAT has subsequently limited the number of im-
plementers to one (with the exception of a three-month 
period between March and May 
2009 when two organizations were 
working). In the context of Gaza, 
where movement, information and 
operations must be tightly con-
trolled for security and political rea-
sons, the advantages of operating 
with only a few organizations are 
numerous. 
The Israeli insistence on a close 
relationship between the U.N. and 
implementing partners meant that 
a relatively unconventional struc-
ture was established. Instead of a 
traditional mine-action coordi-
nation center in which the United 
Nations oversees the work of im-
plementing actors, a “Mine Action 
Team” structure was employed: A 
U.N. Programme Manager runs 
the overall project, while utiliz-
ing the senior technical member 
of staff from the implementing 
NGO as Operations Manager. 
Both components share offices in 
Gaza and Jerusalem, and this in-
tegrated structure has so far led to 
streamlined operations and mini-
mized information gaps, with the 
added advantage of reducing over-
all staffing requirements. 
In two related examples of good 
practice, the program’s structure, 
modus operandi and, to an extent, 
its existence, have been continu-
ally evaluated during its first four 
months. The huge logistical, po-
litical and security constraints to 
operations have meant that sev-
eral “crunch dates” were set, on 
which the management in Gaza 
and UNMAS New York have dis-
cussed whether the program should 
be closed, downsized or expand-
ed to align with the reality on the 
ground. Similarly, the UXO prob-
lem in Gaza has (very deliberately) 
not been over-sold to donors, the 
media or the aid community. From 
the beginning, the United Nations 
and donors were assured that this 
situation was “not another Koso-
vo 1999 or Lebanon 2006,” with no 
evidence of cluster munitions, no 
conventional use of landmines and 
UXO contamination not as exten-
sive as initially expected. With a dis-
tinct mission statement, the project 
could realistically be predicted to 
have a finite scope, with a maximum 
duration of two years from begin-
ning to end. While perhaps some-
what counterintuitive, these factors 
have been beneficial for maintain-
ing donor confidence; in particular, 
the willingness to take a step back 
and honestly examine what the U.N. 
Mine Action Team and its partners 
can achieve (and whether it is use-
ful) has been well-received by those 
funding the program.
Conclusion
Establishing a mine-action pro-
gram in the context of one of the 
world’s longest running conflicts—
where suspicion runs deep in the 
psyches of all actors—has been a 
highly complicated task, even de-
moralizing on occasions when it ap-
peared the political impediments 
were too great to overcome. Yet pa-
tience and persistence, as well as the 
occasional “outside the box” solu-
tion, have contributed to UNMAT’s 
success during its first four months 
in Gaza. Mine action is one of the 
very few humanitarian sectors with 
the ability to operate in Gaza and to 
produce success stories in this high-
ly restrictive environment. The U.N. 
Mine Action Team and partners will 
continue their work in the Gaza Strip 
until January 2011, by which time it 
is hoped that the area’s deadly legacy 
of conflict will have been eliminat-
ed, facilitating a return to a safer and 
more stable life for the people who 
live and work in the Gaza strip. 
See Endnotes, Page 78 
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A 2,000-pound bomb discovered in the second story of a damaged building dem-
onstrates the challenge EOD teams face.
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